The decision of the Nepal Army (NA) to take on the task of constructing the Kathmandu-Tarai Expressway in 2017 must rank as one of its most significant errors of judgement. Delays in the project’s completion have invited widespread political and social questions, eroding public confidence in the institution.

The core stability and perceived political independence of the NA provide an important safeguard to the evolutionary process of Nepal’s young democracy, where many institutions are yet to mature. The public discrediting of the army over its failures in the expressway is dangerous to that evolutionary process and makes Nepal’s already fragile democracy even more vulnerable.

Public disillusionment

The Kathmandu-Tarai Expressway, or fast track, connects the capital and Nijagadh in southern Nepal with a 76-km highway. Once completed, it will cut the current travel time by several hours. With 11 km in bridges and 6 km in tunnels, the expressway is more complex than any road project Nepal has undertaken before.

The NA was entrusted with overseeing the construction of the fast track after many twists and turns, including the award of the contract to an Indian infrastructure finance company that was subsequently revoked.

“Nepal Army has taken the construction of the country’s project of National Pride Kathmandu-Tarai/Madhesh Express Way project. This is the right time to show Nepali people the exemplary work of completing it in time. We have taken this as an opportunity. Nepal Army had not demanded this project…This is the result of the trust and confidence of government and Nepali people towards Nepal Army,” General Rajendra Chhetri, the then Chief of Army Staff, had said in February 2018, a few months after the army took over the project.

Timely completion has been a challenge. Initially scheduled for completion within four years by 2021, the deadline was subsequently extended to December 2024. With further delays, primarily because of contracting failures, it was pushed back again to April 2027.

At a recent hearing before the State Affairs and Good Governance Committee of the House of Representatives on December 21, 2023, Chief of Army Staff Prabhu Ram Sharma said the project was unlikely to be completed even by 2027.

Six years after it began work, confidence in the army’s ability to execute the project has been shaken. The camaraderie between the political class and the army on the project has been broken.

“A serious question has been raised about whether the army should be involved in developing infrastructure projects by going beyond its defined duties,” Gagan Thapa, a Nepali Congress lawmaker, asked at the hearing in Parliament.

“The army didn’t ask for the project, it was you [political leadership] who gave [us] the responsibility,” Sharma, the army chief, responded.

The army chief’s bluster-filled retort to lawmaker Thapa’s rhetorical question may have worked in a politically charged parliamentary hearing. But outside, in public opinion, its impact was that the distinction between politicians and generals, between the political establishment and the institution of the army, was fading.

Nepalis’ disillusionment about the political system, its parties and politicians now extends to the army. Is there any institution left that we, the people, can trust or rely on?

Growing fallout

Many observers had felt that the decision to build the fast-track expressway would not unfold as an “opportunity,” as the former army chief had assessed, but rather as an ambush robbing the army of its public trust. In a 2018 article in Republica, titled “The general’s seduction,” I explained how the army’s decision to undertake the fast-track expressway felt like an institution that had been seduced into it.

Like any person drawn into temptation, the army also appears to have approached the project without full consideration.

“We have been asked to work on the fast track, but the laws are from the 1950s. If relevant laws are not in place on time, I cannot assure the project’s completion in 2027,” the army chief said at the parliamentary hearing. It is hard to imagine that the army had not anticipated the hurdles of laws that have been in place for over half a century and hadn’t sequenced how they would overcome those challenges.

Another dangerous fallout of the army’s involvement in the fast-track expressway project has been that they are now a vested party, instead of a neutral entity, in the policymaking process. Take the case of four trees and land acquisition as examples.

At the same parliamentary hearing, the army chief explained how delays were being caused, claiming it took nine months to get clearances to cut four trees. Other issues, such as private landowners demanding higher compensation than was feasible under applicable laws, were also withholding progress, he said. He called for speedy revisions and amendments of the forest and land acquisition acts.

Policymaking is a highly political process. Cutting four trees hurts some people and benefits others in the same way that land acquisition by the government benefits some and hurts others. The outcome, or decision on which trees to cut or not or how much to compensate for acquired land, is a negotiated political process between the government and stakeholders.

The army is not neutral anymore because it is actively engaged in the political process, advocating for changes to laws even though that may be in the context of the fast-track expressway. Nepal’s army must recognise and respond to the fast-track expressway changing public perception of the institution.

Managing the fallout

The fast-track expressway will eventually be built—it is only a matter of time and money. Unfortunately for Nepalis, or fortunately for some, neither time nor money is in short supply on Nepal’s national pride projects.

As much as working to expedite the completion of the fast-track expressway, the army must also actively engage to manage the fallout of its decision to build the fast-track. The decision to undertake the project cannot be reversed, but the army should consider specific changes in its project approach to arrest the erosion of public trust in the institutions.

First, improved accountability: The army must demonstrate greater accountability on the project. Instead of bristling every time a question is asked, it must engage more proactively, offering greater transparency and communicating more directly with the public and political decision-makers.

Second, local empowerment: Instead of relying only on top-down policy decisions from the central government, the army must engage and empower local government units in decision-making. This could help overcome challenges related to cutting trees and land acquisition. Championing local decision-making would simultaneously help the army regain its public trust and strengthen the devolution of power as envisioned in the constitution.

Third, restructure: Use this fast track to structure a new entity that draws from the army’s technical and managerial expertise, whenever necessary, but remains firmly under non-military civilian authority where projects without sufficient defence or strategic merit appropriately fit. 

(This article was first published by The Kathmandu Post, Nepal).