It has become obvious that the nature and external orientation of the next administration in Dhaka is a serious concern for the US. 

But the obvious unanswered question remains: Where is India in all of this?

How come Delhi is apparently allowing the US to set the agenda?

It is true its diplomats are not exactly sitting on their hands. (Nor, by the way, are the Chinese.) But why they have taken an apparent non-speaking role remains a conundrum.

Delhi down in the dumps?

With Prime Ministers Modi and Sheikh Hasina both celebrating connectivity and power projects, the relationship seems as smooth and set as ever. Perhaps. 

Still, I wonder what the Indian Ministry of External Affairs privately expects to achieve in Bangladesh. 

More to the point, sipping whiskey over the weekend, do they really subscribe to the idea of India as a superpower? 

Publicly, they are certainly not acting like one. A superpower would never allow a distant state -- ally or not -- to ride roughshod over Delhi’s interests, sensibilities, and prerogatives. 

One would expect a confident India would have sent a private, terse telegram to Washington that this is their backyard.

Publicly, they might have explained that while Delhi and Washington share concerns about the benefits of deepening democracy (blah blah blah), that given that India has a rich history of beneficent relations with the lands of the Meghna, Jamuna, and Ganga, it would take the leading role as the sub-continental superpower. 

Once, Delhi’s finest would have been more than capable of guiding Bengali politics in the “right” direction. 

The Indian ambassador might clarify to his US counterpart that Bangladesh is no longer East Pakistan and that the toppling of Imran Khan is not necessary in Bangladesh. 

Delhi cares little about Western adventurism in Islamabad. Here, it is a different kettle of fish.  

Firstly, Dhaka is a lot more ambivalent and transactional towards China than Imran ever was. 

Secondly, the Baluchi-Xinjiang energy link is as important as the Nordstream Pipeline connecting Berlin with St. Petersburg. One could go on.

Bottom line: China has invested a lot less, geo-politically, strategically, economically, and emotionally, in Bangladesh compared to Pakistan. 

Thus India should remain a lot calmer regarding China in its eastern backyard.

Instead, is the danger to Delhi’s own medium-term interests, not stemming from a grand US entry into the Bengali delta and beyond. Myanmar, anyone?

Alas, Indian anglophone elites appear as deluded as Britain’s elites in thinking India has some sort of special relationship with the United States. The recent tilt by Modi towards the US, on the flimsy promise of technological upgrading, offers one explanation for Delhi’s current stance. Add Sinophobia, and it becomes easy to fall into the US orbit, and eventually become prey.

If only Beijing and Delhi would talk about Bangladesh

It is heartening to hear reports of constructive discussions between the two Asian giants over the Himalayas. What a pity they could not translate this to a practical conversation about the Bengali neighbourhood. What a shame no one links the two regions in their mindset. 

With the Awami League in office, India has achieved its long-held need to end the isolation of Assam and the rest (including Arunachal Pradesh/Zang Nan). Bangladesh has opened its lands to trans-shipment. Give it a decade and at last the Brahmaputra may well develop and enter the 21st century.

Bangladesh is cruising at a decent rate and no longer a potential economic disaster in need of rescue. Dhaka, however, faces headwinds in climbing to the next level.

So what is the problem if China builds out the foundations for a more resilient Bangladeshi economy? Unless a Chinese-constructed Sylhet airport terminal sprouts surface-to-air missiles, why is it an issue? 

Is it not clear that Beijing just wants a neutral Bangladesh (translation: No QUAD)? 

Is it not obvious that an incoherent external orientation on the part of Dhaka discourages deeper commitment from China? 

If India were a  genuine superpower, and Delhi’s own neo-cons would relearn the lessons of the post-Mughal era, it might agree with China on parameters for mutual involvement and presence on the eastern edge of the sub-continent, and turn a cold shoulder to its distant ally.

Delhi and Beijing will not bury the hatchet in the short term. Asia’s two superpowers continue to suffer a fractious relationship. To the obvious satisfaction of the US. China also has other fish to fry if they are rebuffed. 

Ultimately, I blame Dhaka’s foreign policy leadership for not showing agency. It could weave an intelligent strategy and stimulate dialogue with and between the Asian giants. For that, new faces and new thinking are needed. There are people who do get it in Dhaka.

Thus I remain optimistic for Bangladesh. In the medium term. “There is great chaos under heaven. The situation is excellent.”  

(This article was first published by Dhaka Tribune, Bangladesh)